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One of the most influential statements in the anomie theory tradition has been Merton’s argument that the volume of instrumental property crime should 
be higher where there is a greater imbalance between the degree of commitment to monetary success goals and the degree of commitment to legitimate 
means of pursuing such goals.  Contemporary anomie theories stimulated by Merton’s perspective, most notably Messner and Rosenfeld’s institutional 
anomie theory, have expanded the scope conditions by emphasizing lethal criminal violence as an outcome to which anomie theory is highly relevant, and 
virtually all contemporary empirical studies have focused on applying the perspective to explaining spatial variation in homicide rates.  In the present 
paper, we argue that current explications of Merton’s theory and IAT have not adequately conveyed the relevance of the core features of the anomie 
perspective to lethal violence.  We propose an expanded anomie model in which an unbalanced pecuniary value system – the core causal variable in 
Merton’s theory and IAT – translates into higher levels of homicide primarily in indirect ways by increasing levels of firearm prevalence, drug market 
activity, and property crime, and by enhancing the degree to which these factors stimulate lethal outcomes.  Using aggregate-level data collected during 
the mid-to-late 1970s for a sample of relatively large social aggregates within the U.S., we find a significant effect on homicide rates of an interaction 
term reflecting high levels of commitment to monetary success goals and low levels of commitment to legitimate means.  Virtually all of this effect is 
accounted for by higher levels of property crime and drug market activity that occur in areas with an unbalanced pecuniary value system.  Our analysis 
also reveals that property crime is more apt to lead to homicide under conditions of high levels of structural disadvantage.  These and other findings 
underscore the potential value of elaborating the anomie perspective to explicitly account for lethal violence.
Assessing the Relevance of Anomie Theory for Explaining 
Spatial Variation in Lethal Criminal Violence:  
An Aggre gate-Level Analysis of Homicide within the 
 United States
Brian J. Stults, College of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Florida State University, United States
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Robert Merton (1938) suggested several decades ago that 
rates of deviance, and especially levels of property crime, 
would be significantly higher in social collectivities in 
which the population has a relatively strong commitment to 
monetary success goals and a relatively weak commitment 
to legitimate means for pursuing such goals. He argued 
further that this result was more likely to occur where the 
social structure provided insufficient opportunities for 
members of the population to achieve valued monetary suc-
cess goals through legitimate avenues (see also Merton 1949, 
1957, 1964, 1968). These core arguments of Merton’s classic 
anomie theory have been influential in stimulating and 
shaping subsequent theoretical contributions on crime and 
violence in the United States and elsewhere (e.g., Bernburg 
2002; Cole 1975; Orru 1987). Most recently, Messner and 
Rosenfeld (1994, 2007) integrate many of the central causal 
elements of Merton’s theory with insights from Parsons, 
Marx, and others in outlining an argument for spatial vari-
ation in serious violence that has become widely known as 
“Institutional Anomie Theory” (IAT). Messner and Rosen-
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feld’s IAT shares with Merton’s theory a core emphasis on 
the criminogenic tendencies of a relatively strong commit-
ment to monetary success goals and a relatively weak com-
mitment to legitimate means for pursuing monetary goals. 
But Messner and Rosenfeld’s theory (2007) also extends 
Merton’s perspective in several important respects, includ-
ing a major elaboration on the sources of spatial variation 
in value commitments, a much more nuanced treatment 
of the range of social structural forces that may be relevant 
for regulating how people respond to cultural prescrip-
tions, and a significant broadening of its scope conditions to 
encompass goal attainment “by any means necessary,” in-
cluding lethal criminal violence. The present study focuses 
on assessing the theoretical and empirical utility of the last 
of these recent expansions of anomie theory, or in other 
words on addressing the relevance of classic and contem-
porary anomie theories for explaining variation in levels of 
homicide across social collectivities.
Although Merton does not fully spell out limits to the scope 
conditions of his anomie theory, he emphasizes money gen-
erating property crime as a key innovative response to the 
pecuniary cultural and structural imbalances upon which 
he focuses and, as far as we can tell, he is notably silent 
on lethal violence in his writings on anomie. In contrast, 
Messner and Rosenfeld (1994, 2007) explicitly state that 
the proper scope conditions for IAT are serious crimi-
nal activities, and they include homicide as a prominent 
example of the kind of outcome relevant to their explana-
tion. Moreover, virtually all of the existing empirical studies 
with stated ties to IAT incorporate homicide rates as an 
outcome variable; most studies do so exclusively, omitting 
other serious crimes such as robbery, burglary, auto theft, 
or the distribution of illicit drugs, which on their face seem 
more directly relevant to the core theoretical arguments 
of classic and contemporary anomie theories (for a review 
of IAT empirical tests, see Messner and Rosenfeld 2006; 
Pratt and Cullen 2005). This is surprising at a conceptual 
level given that the internal logic of Merton’s anomie theory 
and Messner and Rosenfeld’s IAT point easily to predic-
tions of spatial variation in instrumental crimes that will 
facilitate the acquisition of money (Chamlin and Cochran 
1995). Moreover, in our view these theories do not clearly 
specify why members of a population would resort to lethal 
violence to achieve such objectives aside from the relatively 
infrequent instances in which property crimes go wrong 
and end in death (see also Beeghley 2003). While it could 
be argued that homicide is a particularly expedient way to 
achieve a desired end, it appears that homicide is typically 
committed for reasons other than enhancing one’s financial 
circumstances and it is rarely a repeated behavior regardless 
of the motivation (e.g., Maume and Lee 2003; Reidel and 
Walsh 2008; Savolainen, Messner, and Kivivuori 2000). This 
does not necessarily invalidate anomie theory as a potential 
explanation of spatial variation in homicide, but it does 
suggest that the direct effect of anomic social conditions on 
homicide presumed in much of the extant theoretical and 
empirical literature might be modest at best and, more gen-
erally, it points our attention to a consideration of possible 
intervening causal mechanisms that might explain why 
social collectivities with a strong commitment to monetary 
success goals and a relatively weak commitment to legiti-
mate means for pursuing monetary success goals might 
exhibit higher homicide rates.
As we elaborate below, we see several plausible ways in 
which the social conditions emphasized in classic and 
contemporary anomie theories might yield higher levels 
of lethal criminal violence, but in our view the relevant 
mechanisms for describing these linkages have not been 
clearly articulated in previous theoretical explications or 
tested in existing empirical research. In this paper we pro-
pose a slightly expanded anomie perspective that explicitly 
links anomic social conditions to lethal criminal violence. 
Our model highlights the possibility that the combination 
of a strong commitment to monetary success and a weak 
commitment to legitimate means of pursuing monetary 
success (what we refer to as an “unbalanced pecuniary value 
system” or “unbalanced pecuniary value commitments”) 
give rise to higher levels of gun prevalence, higher levels 
of illicit drug market activity, and higher levels of instru-
mental property crime (e.g., robbery, burglary, auto theft, 
and larceny), which in turn translate into higher levels of 
homicide for reasons elaborated below. Given that a modest 
percentage of homicides occur in the context of illicit activi-
ties designed to yield monetary gain, we also expect and test 
for a direct effect on overall homicide rates of a combined 
strong commitment to monetary success and weak com-
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mitment to legitimate means of pursuing monetary success. 
Further, drawing from Merton (1938) and Messner and 
Rosenfeld (2007) we anticipate that any observed direct ef-
fects of this type of unbalanced pecuniary value system on 
homicide or the proposed mediators (gun prevalence, illicit 
drug activity, and property crime) will be conditioned by 
certain aspects of the social structure. Finally, we hypoth-
esize that the effects of gun prevalence, illicit drug market 
activity, and property crime on homicide will be amplified 
where this unbalanced value system is prevalent among 
members of the population. 
We begin by outlining the basic theoretical model implied 
in classic and contemporary anomie theories. We then 
present an expanded model geared toward more explicitly 
clarifying the ways in which the core social arrangements 
emphasized in anomie theory might translate into high lev-
els of lethal criminal violence. We derive several hypotheses 
from this modified anomie model of lethal violence, and 
then test these hypotheses with aggregate cross-sectional 
data from the United States that combines survey data 
from the American General Social Survey (GSS) on levels 
of commitment to monetary success goals and on levels of 
commitment to institutionalized means with data from a 
variety of U.S. sources on several other features of social 
aggregates, including levels of firearm prevalence, illicit 
drug market activity, property crime, and homicide. We 
close with a discussion of the implications of our study for 
classic and contemporary anomie theories and for existing 
research on spatial variation in lethal violence both within 
and across nations.
1.Theory and Hypotheses
1.1.Anomie Theory and Instrumental Property Crime
Baumer and Gustafson (2007) recently specified a theoreti-
cal model that integrates some of the central arguments 
found in Merton’s classic anomie perspective and in Mess-
ner and Rosenfeld’s contemporary Institutional Anomie 
Theory (IAT). They interpret these anomie theories as spec-
ifying cultural and structural influences that affect levels of 
crime mainly by shaping value commitments of members of 
a population. Specifically, in their representation of the two 
theories, greater exposure to a distinctive type of cultural 
structure (a strong cultural emphasis on monetary success 
and a weak cultural emphasis on legitimate or institutional-
ized means of pursuing monetary success) yields—through 
a process of socialization—a larger percentage of persons in 
a given population who have a particular type of value com-
plex: a strong commitment to pursuing monetary success 
goals and a weak commitment to doing so through legiti-
mate means. Social collectivities with a higher prevalence 
of persons who identify with this “unbalanced pecuniary 
value system” will likely exhibit higher levels of instrumen-
tal property crime because such behavior emerges as one of 
the expedient means by which to facilitate the attainment 
of culturally valued goals (619–22). Thus, as shown in Figure 
1, Baumer and Gustafson (2007) suggest that as outlined in 
classic and contemporary anomie perspectives, differences 
across social collectivities in instrumental property crime 
are primarily a function of differences in the percentage of 
community members who are strongly committed to pur-
suing monetary success goals and who are weakly commit-
ted to pursuing monetary goals through legitimate means. 1 
Drawing from Merton, Baumer and Gustafson note further 
that the link between this value complex about the prescrip-
tions and proscriptions of pursuing monetary success goals 
may be amplified in contexts of limited access to legitimate 
opportunities and low levels of achievement and, borrowing 
from Messner and Rosenfeld (1994, 2007), they suggest that 
they may be dampened in contexts of high levels of com-
mitment to non-economic social institutions (622–27).2
1 See Baumer (2007) for an extended 
 discussion of the internal logic implied in 
Merton’s theory for linking cultural and 
structural conditions to deviant behavior.
2 To accommodate the three-way statistical interac-
tions implied in the anomie theories of Merton and 
Messner and Rosenfeld, Baumer and Gustafson 
(2007) use saw-toothed arrows to represent the key 
two-way interaction (i.e., the interaction between 
commitment to monetary success goals and com-
mitment to legitimate means) as a distinct variable, 
designated in Figure 1 as X1X2 (see also Bollen 
1998; Bollen and Paxton 1998). To convey how 
other factors moderate this two-way interaction 
effect, as implied in the two theoretical models 
(i.e., to form the implied three-way interactions), 
the more common approach of drawing an arrow 
from the specified moderator to the causal path that 
represents the two-way interaction effect is used.
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Although several empirical studies have examined hypoth-
eses relevant to Merton’s theory and IAT, the core link-
ages implied in these theories have rarely been examined 
(see also Messner and Rosenfeld 2006). For example, in a 
pioneering empirical test of Institutional Anomie Theory, 
Chamlin and Cochran (1995) examined the effect of poverty 
on property crime rates, and the extent to which that effect 
is conditioned by the strength of non-economic institu-
tions. Though it might be argued that poverty is a rough 
proxy for the desire for material gain coupled with blocked 
opportunities, we still know little about whether instru-
mental property crime rates are greater in social collectivi-
ties with a high level of commitment to monetary success 
goals coupled with a weak level of commitment to using 
legitimate means to pursue monetary success goals, a key 
construct of both versions of anomie theory. Also, little is 
known about whether an insufficient supply of legitimate 
educational and economic opportunities and a high degree 
of involvement in non-economic social institutions serve to 
moderate the effect of this largely unmeasured unbalanced 
value complex.
Baumer and Gustafson (2007) address these issues in a 
preliminary way with a cross-sectional analysis of data 
from U.S. counties and metropolitan areas that yielded 
mixed findings on the empirical validity of the integrated 
anomie model shown in Figure 1. Their findings suggest 
that instrumental property crimes tend to be highest in 
areas in which members of the population express both a 
strong commitment to pursuing monetary success goals 
and a weak commitment to legitimate means for doing so. 
















among citizens to legitimate means 
of pursuing monetary success goals
(X2)
Limited legitimate opportunities for
pursuing monetary success
(X3) and




Commitment to and investment in
education (X5), 
family (X6), political (X7), 
community (X8),
and religious institutions (X9)
Figure 1:  Baumer and Gustafson’s integrated anomie model of property crime
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tendencies of this unbalanced pecuniary value system are 
enhanced by low levels of access to legitimate economic 
and educational opportunities or low levels of achievement, 
as suggested by Merton, the results support Messner and 
Rosenfeld’s contention that such tendencies are dampened 
in the context of high levels of welfare support and contact 
between family members. 
Perhaps the most notable finding that emerged from Baum-
er and Gustafson’s study is that the fundamental argument 
of classic and contemporary anomie theories – that rates of 
instrumental crime are highest in places with a relatively 
strong commitment to monetary success and weak com-
mitment to legitimate means – has empirical merit. Their 
study also leaves some important questions unaddressed, 
however. One thing that remains to be seen, for example, is 
whether the central predictions of these anomie perspec-
tives (i.e., the main and interactive effects of an unbalanced 
pecuniary value system) also are relevant to explaining 
spatial variation in lethal criminal violence. In our view, this 
is more than merely an empirical exercise in determining 
whether similar results would emerge if homicide rates were 
swapped out with instrumental property crime. It raises 
first a basic theoretical question, often taken for granted, 
of whether classic and contemporary anomie theories yield 
clear predictions for geographic differences in levels of 
homicide. Stated more directly, while the expectation of 
higher instrumental crime rates flows quite logically from 
the causal structure of classic and contemporary anomie 
theories, do their scope conditions encompass lethal crimi-
nal violence, or in other words do they also support the 
prediction that a strong commitment to monetary success 
goals coupled with a weakened commitment to legitimate 
means would yield higher levels of homicide? If so, what are 
the mechanisms that link an unbalanced pecuniary value 
system to lethal criminal violence? These are the questions 
to which we now turn.
1.2. Anomie Theory and Lethal Criminal Violence
In his discussion of “modes of adaptation,” Merton (1938, 
1968) mentions several possible behavioral responses that 
might flow from a high level of commitment to monetary 
success goals and a weakened commitment to legitimate 
means. To our knowledge, however, he does not include 
homicide as a likely response. In contrast, Messner and 
Rosenfeld (1994, 2007) explicitly outline the scope condi-
tions relevant to their theory, stating that it encompasses 
serious crimes, which they define as “violations of criminal 
law involving significant bodily injury, the threat of bodily 
injury, or, in the case of nonviolent offenses, significant 
economic harm to victims” (2007, 47). The range of crimes 
covered by Messner and Rosenfeld’s definition of serious 
crimes is broad, including both “street crimes” and “suite 
crimes,” but in various places they emphasize robbery and 
homicide as prominent examples of the types of serious 
crimes to which their perspective is likely most relevant 
(e.g., 2007, 19–22, 47–49).
Perhaps stimulated in part by Messner and Rosenfeld’s ex-
plicit statement of scope conditions, several studies during 
the past decade or so that examine empirical predictions 
relevant to anomie theory, and in particular IAT, have fo-
cused on the explanation of overall homicide rates (Maume 
and Lee 2003; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997; Piquero and 
Piquero 1998; Pratt and Godsey 2003; Pridemore 2008; 
Savolainen 2000; Stucky 2003; for reviews, see Messner and 
Rosenfeld 2006; Pratt and Cullen 2005). The vast majority of 
these studies have examined whether the effects on homi-
cide rates of absolute or relative economic disadvantage are 
moderated by factors such as welfare support, political par-
ticipation, church membership, and family stability. These 
studies have advanced our understanding of spatial varia-
tion in homicide rates, and many have revealed support for 
the idea that high levels of commitment to non-economic 
social institutions or other buffers to free-market economies 
(e.g., the decommodification of labor) can dampen crimino-
genic influences of high rates of poverty and inequality. The 
extant research on anomie and homicide has not addressed, 
however, an arguably more central explanatory question 
of relevance to classic and contemporary anomie theories: 
are homicide rates higher in social collectivities in which a 
larger fraction of the population is strongly committed to 
monetary success goals and weakly committed to legitimate 
means for pursuing monetary goals?
Some scholars have questioned the relevance of anomie the-
ory (however operationalized) for explaining differences in 
lethal criminal violence across social collectivities (Agnew 
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1999; Beeghley 2003; Felson forthcoming; Pare and Felson 
2007). Although this theme has not been developed exten-
sively in the literature, in essence the critics suggest that 
classic and contemporary anomie perspectives do not en-
compass a proximate theory or explanation of how people 
might become motivated to use violence, something they 
see as essential to explaining why the criminogenic “pres-
sures” that emanate from a social context in which there is 
a high level of emphasis on pursuing monetary success and 
a low level of emphasis on using legitimate means to do so 
would lead to lethal outcomes. One of the proposed exten-
sions to the anomie perspective that emerges from extant 
literature is to integrate elements of the general frustration/
aggression violence perspective. For example, Agnew (1999) 
suggests that a significant portion of the observed variation 
in levels of violence across social collectivities, including 
lethal violence, is due to variation in levels of frustration, 
anger, and other states of negative affect. 
The issue of whether “frustration” is central or even relevant 
to the basic anomie argument under examination here has 
been the subject of heated debate (cf., Agnew 1987; Bernard 
1987). Our position on the matter is that it is plausible to 
suggest that the combination of a strong degree of com-
mitment to monetary success and weak commitment 
to legitimate means, the key process emphasized in the 
anomie theories of Merton and of Messner and Rosenfeld, 
could give rise to high levels of frustration or anger, espe-
cially when accompanied by relatively low levels of access 
to legitimate (and realistic) means for achieving monetary 
success or few buffers from competitive market conditions. 
And higher levels of frustration or anger in an area may 
yield higher levels of violence (Agnew 1999). Nevertheless, 
this modification fundamentally alters the anomie theoreti-
cal framework, de-emphasizes the key concepts and, in our 
view, is not necessary for illuminating the relevance of clas-
sic and contemporary anomie theories for explaining cross-
sectional differences in levels of lethal criminal violence (see 
also Bernard 1987). Indeed, a distinctive feature of Merton’s 
anomie theory and IAT is that they describe both the forces 
that might provide the impetus or motivation for deviance 
and also the forces that might regulate such motivation (see 
also Messner and Rosenfeld 1994). Given this, we do not see 
the need to elaborate the anomie theoretical model with an 
additional “motivational” component (e.g., a frustration-
aggression argument) to explain variation in levels of lethal 
violence. But we do find merit in the critique that, while 
anomie perspectives provide a logical explanation for why 
certain socially structured pressures related to economic 
goal attainment would yield higher levels of crimes whose 
intended purpose is to enhance one’s financial circum-
stances, they do not adequately explain how those pressures 
would translate into higher levels of lethal criminal vio-
lence, except of course for the modest proportion of cases in 
which money-generating crime turns deadly. 
In another critique of the relevance of anomie theory for 
explaining variation in levels of lethal violence, Beeghley 
(2003) argues that key factors identified in prior research as 
sources of variation in homicide rates are ignored or dis-
missed as unimportant. He contends that although anomie 
perspectives are useful and highly relevant for understand-
ing the nature of American society, these theories cannot 
explain the unusually high rate of homicide in the United 
States since they do not account for other highly correlated 
structural characteristics such as the widespread availability 
of guns and the rapid expansion of drug markets. While 
recognizing the potential of anomie perspectives to explain 
variation in economically motivated crimes, Beeghley 
argues that “crime and homicide ought to be considered as 
separate problems” because “the high rate of lethal violence 
in the United States has more specific structural sources 
than the anomic character of American Society” (p.95). 
We concur with Beeghley (2003) on the value of question-
ing the ability of classic and contemporary anomie theories 
to explain variation in any form of crime other than those 
with a purpose of economic gain, and particularly homi-
cide since it is emphasized in much of the theoretical and 
empirical literature. There are extensive, long-standing 
literatures detailing the connection between numerous 
macro-social characteristics and homicide rates that should 
be recognized in any fully specified theoretical account 
of aggregate patterns in lethal violence. Outlining the full 
details of such a theory is not the main purpose of Messner 
and Rosenfeld’s anomie theory (2007), but it is noteworthy 
that recent statements of the theory have attended more 
directly to the potential importance of guns and illicit drugs 
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in generating high levels of lethal violence. In fact, Messner 
and Rosenfeld (2006) emphasize not only the importance 
of examining the proximate effect of the availability of guns 
and the prevalence of illicit drug use and drug market activ-
ity on homicide rates, but also the importance of explaining 
why there is such a high level of variability across social 
collectivities in the prevalence of gun, drug use, and drug 
market activity. They do not fully develop such an explana-
tion in their writing on IAT, but as we explain next, the core 
anomie theoretical argument is potentially useful in this 
regard and, consequently, by elaborating the anomie argu-
ment in a simple and straightforward manner it is possible 
to broaden the scope of the perspective to include not only 
economically motivated forms of property crime, but also 
both instrumental and expressive forms of lethal violence. 
We illustrate in Figure 2 an elaborated anomie theoretical 
model that integrates some well-known covariates of lethal 
criminal violence (gun prevalence, illicit drug use, and 
property crime) and summarizes how they might link the 
central causal element of classic and contemporary anomie 
perspectives – unbalanced pecuniary value commitments 
– to spatial variation in homicide. We describe this elabo-
rated model in more detail below while also specifying the 
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Figure 2:  Modified integrated anomie model of lethal criminal violence.
223IJCV : Vol. 2 (2) 2008, pp. 215 – 247Brian J. Stults, and Eric P. Baumer: Assessing the Relevance of Anomie Theory for Explaining Spatial Variation
1.3. Indirect Effects of Unbalanced Pecuniary Values on Lethal Violence
The original formulations of current and classic versions of 
anomie theory do not clearly explicate the ways in which 
anomic conditions can be linked with variation in levels of 
lethal violence. One possibility is that unbalanced pecu-
niary value commitments can influence homicide rates 
indirectly through their effects on some of the structural 
characteristics that have been the focus of previous homi-
cide research. Two such factors are the availability of guns 
and illicit drug market activity, both of which have been 
the subject of extensive, albeit sometimes contentious, 
discussion in the criminological literature. A third poten-
tial mediating factor is property crime itself. As we have 
already described, anomie theories clearly include in their 
scope conditions the ability to explain variation in levels 
of economically motivated crime. If a link can be drawn 
between rates of property crime and homicide, there is po-
tential for anomie to explain the latter through its influence 
on the former. We now discuss the potential effect of an 
unbalanced pecuniary value system on each of these three 
factors, and their subsequent influence on homicide rates. 
Data from the early 1980s through the 1990s show that the 
dramatic increase and subsequent decrease in homicide 
rates in the United States was almost entirely precipitated by 
changes in gun-related homicide (Blumstein and Wallman 
2006). The strong correlation between gun prevalence and 
rates of lethal violence led Blumstein, Rivara, and Rosenfeld 
(2000) to argue that “the role of weapons must figure cen-
trally in any credible explanation of U.S. homicide trends 
over the past 2 decades” (510), and Zimring and Hawkins 
(1997) state that guns are “so prominently associated with 
the high death rate from violence that starting from any 
other topic would rightly be characterized as an intentional 
evasion” (106). Yet, there is intense debate about the causal 
meaning and direction of the guns-homicide connection, 
with some even arguing that the apparent relationship 
between them is simply a coincidence (Kates and Polsby 
2000; Kleck 1991). In response, Zimring and Hawkins (1997) 
recognize that gun availability is neither a necessary nor 
sufficient explanation of high rates of homicide, but they 
consider gun prevalence to be a contributing cause that, in 
combination with the willingness to use maximum force, is 
the most important contribution to high rates of violence.
But what might explain this willingness to use guns for 
lethal violence, and how does this relate to classic and con-
temporary anomie theories? Messner and Rosenfeld (2006) 
note that gun availability may be an important factor in ex-
plaining variation in homicide rates, but that such explana-
tions are typically incomplete because they “fail to consider 
why firearms are so abundant and so often used in violent 
confrontations” (19). We propose that anomie theory may 
be useful for explaining both levels of gun prevalence and 
the extent to which this translates into high rates of lethal 
violence. One of the hallmarks of the anomie perspective 
is that when strong commitments to monetary success are 
paired with weak commitments to using legitimate means, 
innovative and technically expedient means to achieving 
success goals are more likely to be used. Given that pos-
sessing and being prepared to use a firearm is a particu-
larly efficient means for obtaining desired goods, solving 
disputes, and generally imposing one’s will, it is plausible 
that such a value system could lead to higher rates of gun 
ownership. This logic, along with research linking gun 
prevalence and homicide (Cohen, Gorr, and Singh 2002; 
Rosenfeld, Baumer, and Messner 2007), suggests an indirect 
path whereby anomic conditions influence both instrumen-
tal and expressive forms of homicide through their influ-
ence on gun availability. More specifically, we expect the 
prevalence of guns will at least partially mediate the positive 
effect of unbalanced pecuniary value commitments on rates 
of lethal violence.
Another way in which contemporary and classic anomie 
theories might explain variation in rates of lethal violence is 
through the increase in illicit drug use and market activity 
that an unbalanced pecuniary value system may engender. 
Literature on the link between illicit drug markets and 
lethal violence in the United States is extensive, with much 
of it highlighting the similar longitudinal trends exhibited 
by levels of drug market activity and homicide in the 1980s 
and 1990s (Blumstein 1995; Blumstein, Rivara, and Rosen-
feld 2000; Blumstein and Wallman 2006; Cork 1999). After 
reaching a peak in 1980, the U.S. homicide rate declined for 
the next five years, and then began edging upward again, 
predominantly driven by dramatic increases in the homi-
cide offense rate among juveniles (Blumstein 1995). Many 
researchers attribute this trend to the arrival, and subse-
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quent rapid expansion, of crack cocaine in U.S. cities during 
this same period, and the disproportionate level of involve-
ment of juveniles in the drug trade (Baumer 1994; Baumer, 
et al. 1998; Blumstein 1995; Cork 1999; Ousey and Lee 2007).
The most common explanation of the connection between 
drugs and crime comes from Goldstein’s “tri-partite” 
conceptualization (1985; 1989) which suggests three ways in 
which drugs and violence may be related. First, the pharma-
cological effect of ingesting an illicit substance may cause 
mood changes that lead to violent behavior or violent vic-
timization. Second, drug users may engage in economically 
motivated violence to support their habit. Third, violence is 
often a regular means of doing business in the illicit drug 
trade, including the violent enforcement of norms within 
drug networks, solving disputes over territory, retaliation 
among drug dealers, killings resulting from disagreements 
during drug sales, and punishment for failing to pay debts. 
Lethal violence as “self-help” is deemed necessary in the 
absence of legal mechanisms for solving disputes and the 
lack of property rights enjoyed by those in legal markets 
(Black 1983; Grogger 2005). Other work suggests a fourth 
component of the drugs-crime connection whereby this 
systemic readiness to engage in violence can diffuse into 
areas outside of the direct domain of drug markets, such 
as when the norms and behavior that dominate the drug 
industry influence the behavior of individuals within the 
broader community who are not directly involved with the 
drug trade (Anderson 1999; Blumstein 1995).
The evidence for a link between the prevalence of illicit 
drug activity and homicide rates is strong, but how might 
this connection be related to, and perhaps explained by, 
anomie theory? We believe the preceding discussion implies 
several ways in which unbalanced pecuniary value com-
mitments may indirectly affect levels of lethal violence by 
influencing drug use and market activity, and may also 
condition the effect of drug use and market activity on 
homicide rates. With regard to drug use, Merton (1938) 
suggested that retreating into drug use and addiction is 
one way in which individuals may adapt to the strain that 
stems from a discrepancy between their commitment to 
the pursuit of monetary success and the availability of and 
commitment to using legitimate means. To the extent that 
drug use relates to violence, either pharmacologically or 
stemming from economic need, rates of drug use may serve 
as a potential link between anomic conditions and rates of 
homicide. Likewise, this unbalanced set of value commit-
ments can lead to increased rates of participation in drug 
markets as individuals seek ways to pursue monetary suc-
cess goals using any available means. Indeed, ethnographic 
research has illustrated the similarities between the drug 
trade and legitimate paths to success, with some researchers 
highlighting a common strategy of moving back and forth 
between legal and illegal work, whichever is most available 
and profitable (Adler 1995; Bourgois 2003; Freeman 1996). 
When combined with the literature linking drugs and vio-
lence, this leads us to the expectation that levels of drug use 
and drug market activity will at least partially mediate the 
positive effect of unbalanced pecuniary value commitments 
on rates of lethal violence.
A final intervening link that we propose as an explanation 
of the relationship between anomie and lethal violence is 
property crime. Though prior literature is less precise in 
explicating the link between rates of property crime and ho-
micide, there are several reasons to believe that the two may 
be conceptually distinct and causally related (Katz 1988; see 
also Rosenfeld 2008). 
One way in which property crime might yield higher levels 
of lethal violence is by channeling guns into the hands of 
participants of street culture and illegal markets. Ethno-
graphic research on burglary reveals that guns are a prized 
commodity and are often sought out during break-ins 
(Wright and Decker 1994). Although the available data 
are imperfect, it is believed that several hundred thousand 
guns are stolen each year in the United States, and that a 
non-trivial proportion of the guns used during the commis-
sion of crimes were either stolen by their users or obtained 
from sources that likely acquired the guns through a theft 
of some sort (Sheley and Wright 1993; Zawitz 1995). And, as 
noted above, although the evidence is mixed a higher preva-
lence of guns in local areas has been linked to higher homi-
cide rates (e.g., Cohen et al. 2002; Rosenfeld et al. 2007).
Prior research also has found that the victims of crime are 
often criminal offenders themselves (Hindelang, Got-
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tfredson, and Garofalo 1978; Lauritsen, Sampson, and Laub 
1991). Some suggest that this is due to risky lifestyles that 
increase the likelihood of both offending and victimization 
(Baron 1997; Dobrin 2001; Gottfredson 1981), but victimiza-
tion of criminal offenders may also occur during transac-
tions within the broader criminal market, such as between 
burglars and fences. Participants in these markets obviously 
do not enjoy the same legal protection of their property 
rights as participants in legal markets, and in the absence 
of such formal recourse for solving disputes, violence 
becomes more likely as a means of social control (Black 
1983; Goldstein 1985; Grogger 2005). Where property crime 
is prevalent, such illegal markets are likely to emerge and 
expand, thus increasing the potential for lethal violence as a 
response to property crime victimization.
Finally, as discussed earlier with regard to illicit drug 
markets, the reliance on violence or the threat of violence 
as a means of social control and conflict resolution can dif-
fuse beyond criminal markets and emerge as a prevailing 
norm in the broader community. Indeed, some have found 
that areas characterized by high levels of crime, isolation, 
and disadvantage are likely to have high rates of violence 
and incidents of retaliatory homicide as residents increas-
ingly rely on informal methods of control (Anderson 1999; 
Jacobs and Wright 2006; Kubrin and Weitzer 2003). In his 
ethnographic study of an inner-city Philadelphia ghetto, 
Anderson (1999) found that the approval of and willing-
ness to engage in violence that dominated the street culture 
had become the predominant view even among “decent” 
families that otherwise subscribed to typical middle-class 
values and norms. In these contexts, violence, and even 
lethal violence, can be seen as an appropriate response to 
the personal affront of property crime victimization (Jacobs 
and Wright 2006). Taken together, these arguments and 
prior research lead to the expectation that areas character-
ized by high rates of property crime are likely to also have 
high rates of lethal violence.
The theoretical connection between anomie and prop-
erty crime is well established (Merton 1938; Messner and 
Rosenfeld 2007) and empirical research has been support-
ive (Baumer and Gustafson 2007; Chamlin and Cochran 
1995). The expectation is that areas where the population 
is strongly committed to the pursuit of economic goals 
and weakly committed to using legitimate means will tend 
to have higher rates of economically motivated crime. If 
property crime is, in turn, related to levels of lethal violence 
as suggested above, then we would expect that the property 
crime rate will at least partially mediate the positive effect of 
unbalanced value commitments on homicide rates. 
1.4. Direct Effect of Unbalanced Pecuniary Values on Lethal Violence
So far we have outlined several ways in which anomie 
theory might explain variation in homicide rates. Social 
collectivities predominantly characterized by strong com-
mitments to monetary goals but weak commitments to 
legitimate means are likely to have a greater prevalence of 
guns, active drug markets, and higher rates of property 
crime, all of which may be associated with increased levels 
of lethal violence. In addition to having these distal ef-
fects on homicide, as we illustrate in Figure 2 our review of 
the theoretical literature also suggests that anomic social 
conditions can have a more proximate effect. It is clear that 
both classic and contemporary anomie theories expect that 
an unbalanced pecuniary value system will lead directly to 
increased levels of instrumental crime. This suggests the 
possibility of a direct effect of anomic conditions on levels 
of lethal violence since some homicides are instrumental in 
nature, given that their primary purpose is “not to hurt the 
other person, but to gain something else from the violence, 
such as money or property” (Block, et al. 2000, 94). This 
type of homicide falls squarely within the scope conditions 
of anomie theories. From Merton’s perspective, this form 
of lethal violence represents the most perversely innovative 
response to pressures for economic success when legitimate 
means are not equally emphasized. From Messner and 
Rosenfeld’s perspective, lethal violence can be viewed as a 
powerful, expedient, and universally available means for 
monetary gain, which is culturally prescribed as the very 
definition of success and self-worth. Therefore, where value 
commitments are unbalanced, lethal violence is more likely 
to be used as a direct means for achieving material goals.
Estimates vary regarding the proportion of all homicides 
committed with the goal of material gain, largely due to 
the difficulties inherent in classification and measurement. 
Though not a direct measure of the instrumental nature of 
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homicide, Savolainen et al. (2000) find that about 22 percent 
of U.S. homicides occur during the commission of another 
crime, meaning more than three-fourths were committed 
with murder as the sole intent. Unfortunately, the largest 
category of homicides in this study consisted of those for 
which the circumstance was unknown, and of particular 
importance for the current study, there was no indication of 
whether or not the crime that led to homicide was, in fact, 
instrumental in nature. Using the same data source, but for 
different years and with the explicit purpose of identifying 
instrumental and expressive homicides, Meithe and Drass 
(1999) found similar numbers with only about 20 percent 
of homicides classified as instrumental. By comparison, 
Maume and Lee (2003) found in their sample of 454 coun-
ties that, on average, instrumental homicides constitute a 
little over one-third of all homicides. Using data from the 
St. Louis Police Department for the period 1985–89, Decker 
(1993) found that 47 percent of homicides were instrumental 
in nature. Thus, despite considerable variation across these 
studies, one consistent finding is that instrumental homi-
cides, though not the modal type, represent a non-trivial 
proportion of all homicides. This leads us to the expectation 
that even after controlling for mediating factors, unbal-
anced pecuniary value commitments will have a direct 
positive effect on rates of lethal violence.
1.5.  Social Structural Moderation of Unbalanced Pecuniary Values
Our discussion to this point about possible direct and 
indirect effects of an unbalanced pecuniary value system on 
homicide rates has purposely overlooked an important fea-
ture of the classic and contemporary anomie perspectives 
under review: the implied conditional effects on deviance 
of unbalanced pecuniary value commitments. Specifically, 
as we illustrate in Figure 2, Merton (1938) argued that the 
supply and distribution of legitimate opportunities and 
realization of economic achievement shapes the likely 
responses of a population when there is a high level of com-
mitment to pursuing monetary success goals and a low level 
of commitment to legitimate means. According to Merton, 
when individuals confront obstacles to satisfying monetary 
success goals through legitimate means, or perceive that the 
supply of legitimate opportunities is inadequate or unevenly 
distributed, the likelihood of using illegitimate means will 
increase. Empirically, we interpret Merton’s argument (1938, 
1968) as implying that the tendency for unbalanced pecuni-
ary values to translate into higher levels of property crime, 
illicit drug market activity, firearm prevalence, and homi-
cide will be amplified under conditions of limited access to 
legitimate means for pursuing monetary success goals and 
low levels of economic attainment (see also Baumer and 
Gustafson 2007). This represents possible three-way interac-
tions between commitment to monetary success goals, 
commitment to legitimate means, and indicators of access 
to legitimate opportunities and absolute and relative levels 
of economic achievement. 
Using similar logic, but incorporating a broader view of the 
social structure, Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) highlight 
the potential importance of several key social institutions 
in regulating the criminogenic tendencies of an unbal-
anced pecuniary value system. They emphasize the relative 
strength of economic, political, educational, and familial 
institutions in the United States and suggest that a greater 
level of investment or participation in key non-economic 
social institutions will temper the ways in which people 
pursue monetary success goals in a context of weakened 
levels of commitment to legitimate means. More specifical-
ly, Messner and Rosenfeld argue that where non-economic 
social institutions are stronger there is likely to be greater 
exposure to external social controls and social supports, 
as well as a healthier dose of anti-deviant/pro-legitimate 
socialization with respect to proscriptions for pursuing 
monetary success goals. Empirically, this suggests that the 
tendency for unbalanced pecuniary values to translate into 
higher levels of property crime, illicit drug market activ-
ity, firearm prevalence, and homicide will be mitigated 
where there is greater participation and investment in 
non-economic social institutions that work to counter such 
an imbalance. These arguments imply three-way statisti-
cal interactions between commitment to monetary success 
goals, commitment to legitimate means, and indicators of 
non-economic social institutional strength. 
1.6. Unbalanced Pecuniary Values and the Am-
plification of Lethal Violence
Although classic and contemporary anomie theories, at 
least as articulated by Merton and Messner and Rosenfeld, 
highlight the possibility that the effect of an unbalanced 
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pecuniary value system on crime might be conditioned 
by social structure, we think it is also plausible that the 
presence of such an imbalance itself might condition other 
causal factors, namely by amplifying the extent to which 
the prevalence of firearms, illicit drug market activity, and 
property crime yield high levels of lethal violence. 
As noted above, available firearms serve as expedient and 
innovative, albeit illegal, aids in pursuing pecuniary goals. 
However, the wide availability of guns does not necessarily 
translate into higher levels of homicide; people must also 
be willing to use those guns for lethal violence. We contend 
that the elevated willingness to use any means necessary 
that is expected in a context characterized by unbalanced 
pecuniary value commitments would increase not only the 
prevalence of guns in that context as discussed above, but 
also the likelihood that the prevalence of guns will translate 
into higher levels of lethal violence. This suggests that, in 
addition to having an indirect effect on homicide rates, an 
unbalanced pecuniary value system may also condition the 
relationship between gun prevalence and rates of lethal vio-
lence. Empirically, we expect that the positive effect of gun 
prevalence on homicide rates will be larger in areas where 
the population has a strong commitment to pursuing mon-
etary success goals and a weak commitment to legitimate 
means for doing so.
We also explained above how the unbalanced value system 
emphasized in anomie theory can increase homicide rates 
indirectly through its effect on illicit drug activity. But, in a 
similar way to our arguments concerning gun prevalence, 
it is possible that this value complex will also increase the 
likelihood that drug use and participation in the drug mar-
ket will lead to lethal outcomes. The prevailing willingness 
to use any means necessary in the pursuit of monetary goals 
that emerges under anomic conditions is likely to increase 
the willingness to use lethal force in the pursuit of drugs, 
in drug transactions, and in the regular daily business 
surrounding the drug market. Cross-national comparisons 
are telling in this regard. Nearly all Western industrialized 
nations outlaw the same set of substances as the United 
States, and they have also experienced increases in rates of 
drug use and the emergence and proliferation of illicit drug 
markets (Ruggiero and South 1995; United Nations 2007). 
Yet, there is little indication of a linkage between illicit drug 
markets and lethal violence in these countries (Zimring 
and Hawkins 1997). One explanation of the unusually lethal 
nature of the drug trade in the United States is the exag-
gerated anomic cultural orientation that is also unique to 
that country (Messner and Rosenfeld 2007). This suggests 
to us that across the counties and metropolitan areas in our 
sample, where the population has a strong commitment to 
monetary success goals and a weak commitment to legiti-
mate means, the positive effect of drug use and drug market 
activity on lethal violence will be greater.
As with gun prevalence and drug markets, we also expect 
that the effect of property crime rates on homicide rates will 
be conditioned by the imbalance between commitments to 
economic goals and the legitimate means for pursuing those 
goals. Where there is greater willingness to use any means 
necessary to pursue goals, and a preference for the most 
expedient tools available, the response to property crime 
victimization is more likely to be violent and lethal in na-
ture. Likewise, where such anomic conditions predominate, 
it is more likely that property crimes will end in violence 
when unanticipated circumstances arise such as a home-
owner or third-party interrupting a burglary or other theft. 
This may not be common, but given the large number of 
property crimes relative to homicides, even a small number 
of property-crimes-turned-homicide could yield a sizable 
increase in the homicide rate (see Rosenfeld and Fornango 
2007, 742, for a similar argument). Formally speaking, then, 
we expect that the positive effect of property crime rates on 
homicide rates will be stronger in areas characterized by 
unbalanced pecuniary value commitments.
In summary, classic and contemporary anomie theories 
make a compelling argument for how the combination of a 
high level of commitment to monetary success goals and a 
low level of commitment to legitimate means may translate 
into higher levels of instrumental property crime. Property 
crimes occasionally lead to lethal outcomes, so anomie 
theory also may be useful for explaining variation in instru-
mental homicides across social collectivities. However, the 
utility of the anomie perspective for explaining variation 
in overall homicide rates is questionable because existing 
explications have not spelled out why the value orientations 
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central to the perspective would lead to lethal violence in 
more general ways. We suggest an elaborated anomie model 
above in which a strong level of commitment to monetary 
success goals and weak commitment to legitimate means of 
economic goal attainment translate into higher homicide 
rates by increasing levels of gun prevalence, illicit drug 
market activity, and instrumental property crime. Further, 
according to Merton (1938), the main effects of this unbal-
anced pecuniary value system on “innovative” responses, 
such as homicide, property crime, drug market activity, and 
gun prevalence, should be amplified in contexts of limited 
legitimate opportunities and low economic attainment, 
and as argued by Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) these effect 
should be dampened where there is a high level of commit-
ment to or participation in non-economic social institu-
tions. Finally, we suspect that the causal effects of firearms, 
drug markets, and property crime on lethal violence will be 
amplified where there is a relatively strong commitment to 
monetary success goals and a weak commitment to legiti-
mate means.
2. Data and Methods
2.1. Data
We examine the relationships highlighted above with data 
from several sources that describe levels of lethal violence, 
instrumental property crime, illicit drug market participa-
tion, the availability of firearms, levels of commitment to 
pursuing monetary success goals, levels of commitment to 
using legitimate means to pursue monetary success goals, 
and several other aggregate-level characteristics across 
seventy-four geographic areas in the United States for the 
mid-to-late 1970s. Our sample is somewhat smaller than the 
one used by Baumer and Gustafson (2007) because we could 
not locate data for all cases on our proposed mediating 
variables, but the overall patterns revealed in our data (e.g., 
means, variances, correlations) are virtually identical to the 
patterns they report.
2.2. Units of Analysis and Sample
The units of analysis for our study represent seventy-four of 
the eighty-seven metropolitan areas and non-metropolitan 
counties that compose the sampling frame for the Ameri-
can General Social Survey (GSS).3 We adopt these units 
of analysis because they permit us to construct measures 
of some of the key constructs emphasized in classic and 
contemporary anomie theories. Most notable in this regard 
are the indicators of levels of commitment to monetary suc-
cess and to legitimate means, which cannot be derived from 
other sources and are only asked on a consistent basis in the 
GSS during the mid-to-late 1970s. The GSS sampling units 
are selected with the purpose of generating a nationally rep-
resentative sample of households in the continental United 
States and, given this sampling scheme, the units chosen 
reflect a broad sample of geographic areas across the nation. 
Moreover, because samples drawn within these units are 
“self-representing,” aggregated responses from the sample 
units are designed to be representative of the population 
from which they are drawn (for a more detailed discussion 
of GSS sampling methods, see Davis and Smith 1998, Ap-
pendix A). Capitalizing on this feature of the data collec-
tion, a growing number of studies have aggregated indi-
vidual responses from the GSS for purposes of constructing 
measures of key theoretical constructs that are not readily 
available from alternative sources (e.g., Baumer, Messner, 
and Rosenfeld 2003; Kleck 2004; Moody and Marvell 2005; 
Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer 2001). We follow the lead 
of the latter studies by using the GSS to aggregate responses 
within our sample units to construct aggregate-level mea-
sures of concepts that are central to evaluating the empiri-
cal validity of the mediating and moderating hypotheses 
derived above from the elaborated model of anomie theory.
2.3. Measures
To preserve the temporal order implied in the elaborated 
anomie model outlined above, we assess the effects of 
3 Past research on crime and social control has 
shown that the GSS sample of counties and 
metropolitan areas generates aggregate-level 
findings that are very similar to analyses based 
on more conventional samples of cities, counties, 
and metropolitan areas (e.g., Rosenfeld, Messner, 
and Baumer 2001; Stults and Baumer 2007). 
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explanatory measures constructed from the GSS and other 
sources estimated approximately for 1975–76 on levels of 
instrumental property crime, illicit drug use and market ac-
tivity, firearm prevalence, and homicide rates estimated for 
1977. In doing so, we assume that the value discrepancy that 
is central to classic and contemporary anomie theories (i.e., 
a strong commitment to monetary success goals coupled 
with a weak commitment to legitimate means) exhibits 
a short lag in generating higher levels of property crime, 
drug use and drug market activity, and firearm prevalence, 
and that these phenomena have a contemporaneous effect 
on levels of lethal violence. As noted above, the general 
time frame for our research—the mid-to-late 1970s—was 
dictated by the unique opportunity this period offers to 
measure aggregate-level constructs relevant to anomie 
theory in the GSS, most notably the central construct based 
on our reading of Merton’s theory and IAT (i.e., the degree 
to which social collectivities exhibit an unbalanced pecuni-
ary value complex). 
2.3.1. Dependent Variable
Homicide rate. The dependent variable in our study is the 
overall rate of homicide, which we constructed using data 
on homicides and population counts from the National 
Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) compressed mortality 
file. Given that homicide is a relatively rare event, especially 
in some of the non-metropolitan areas in our sample, we 
followed conventional practice and constructed a three year 
average homicide rate centered around 1977. Specifically, we 
obtained the average annual number of deaths recorded be-
tween 1976 and 1978 which had homicide as an underlying 
cause and the annual estimated population for this period 
to compute the homicide rate for our sample units, defined 
as the number of homicides per 100,000 residents. 
2.3.2. Hypothesized Mediating Variables
A large portion of our analysis is devoted to examining 
whether firearm prevalence, levels of illicit drug use and 
drug market activity, and property crime rates mediate any 
observed effect on homicide of levels of commitment to 
monetary success and levels of commitment to legitimate 
means. Thus, measures of these constructs serve as key 
explanatory variables in our analysis.
Firearm prevalence. We combine two indicators shown 
in prior research to be the best available means by which 
to capture spatial variation in levels of gun prevalence: a 
survey-based estimate of the percentage of households that 
contain at least one handgun, and public health data on 
the percentage of suicides committed with a firearm. The 
literature suggests that survey-derived measures are the 
“gold standard” for gauging levels of firearm prevalence 
across geographic areas, and several recent assessments 
have concluded that among the many other indicators used 
to measure gun prevalence, the fraction of suicides com-
mitted with a firearm is superior with respect to criterion 
validity (Azrael, Cook, and Miller 2004; Cook and Ludwig 
2004; Kleck 2004; Rosenfeld, Baumer, and Messner 2007). 
Accordingly, we used the geocoded GSS described above 
to construct a measure of the percentage of households in 
our sample areas that contained one or more pistols, and 
we used data from the NCHS to estimate the percentage of 
suicides committed with a firearm. The GSS measure was 
created by aggregating within our sample units responses 
to an item asked between 1975 and 1977 that inquires about 
whether there is a pistol in the home (see also Kleck 2004; 
Rosenfeld, Fornango, and Rengifo 2007). The firearm 
suicide measure was created by obtaining estimates of total 
suicides and firearm suicides in our sample units for 1977 
and using these two counts to compute the percentage of all 
suicides that involved a firearm. Prior research has docu-
mented that these two measures are highly correlated across 
geographic areas (e.g., Kleck 2004), so we standardized and 
summed the items to form a single index, which we label 
firearm prevalence (alpha=88). 
Illicit drug use and drug market activity. Measuring illicit 
drug use and drug market activity for local areas within 
the United States has proven to be challenging (National 
Research Council 2001). Absent sufficient survey data on 
drug use patterns and routine or widespread data collec-
tion on drug market conditions for subnational geographic 
units, previous studies have relied mainly on police-based 
data sources and medical records from emergency rooms 
and coroner’s offices. The indicators most often used in 
aggregate-level crime studies in the United States have 
been arrest rates for drug sales and drug-induced death 
rates (e.g., Baumer et al. 1998; Blumstein 1995; Fryer et al. 
2007; Messner et al. 2007; Ousey and Lee 2004; Rosenfeld, 
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Fornango, and Rengifo 2007; Warner and Coomer, 2003). 
Although other indicators (e.g., drug testing results from 
arrestees, drug pricing data) are available for specific peri-
ods and places, drug arrest rates and drug mortality rates 
have been shown in recent research to exhibit the greatest 
degree of shared variance among available measures (Fryer 
et al. 2007). Accordingly, we draw from UCR arrest data to 
construct a measure of the number of arrest for the sale or 
manufacture of illicit drugs per 100,000 and from NCHS 
data to construct a measure of the number of drug-induced 
deaths per 100,000 in our sample units for circa 1977. In 
both cases, the estimates are based on data pooled between 
1976 and 1978 to increase the stability of the measures. Also, 
because the drug mortality rate was positively skewed, we 
applied a log transformation to the measure. The two drug 
activity indicators are only moderately correlated in our 
sample (r=.35), so we analyzed them separately in the analy-
sis presented below.4
Property crime. The indicator of property crime used in our 
analysis is a composite variable that captures differences 
across places in the relative frequency of crime geared pri-
marily toward the acquisition of money or goods that could 
be converted to cash. We used county-level data from the 
Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program to construct this 
measure, which reflects the number of robberies, burglaries, 
larcenies, and auto thefts known to the police per 100,000 
residents in our sample units for 1977.
2.3.3. Explanatory Variables
The key explanatory variables in our analysis are levels of 
commitment to monetary success and levels of commit-
ment to legitimate means. We used the GSS to construct 
indicators of these concepts, which we view as the center-
piece of classic and contemporary anomie theories, at least 
as articulated by Merton (1938, 1968) and by Messner and 
Rosenfeld (1994, 2007). Specifically, we combined GSS data 
from 1973 to 1976 and aggregated survey responses within 
our sample units to construct estimates of the degree of 
commitment among members of the population to pursu-
ing monetary success and the degree of commitment to 
legitimate means of pursuing monetary success goals. The 
degree of commitment to monetary success goals is mea-
sured with an item from the GSS that taps whether resi-
dents of the sample communities agreed with the statement 
that “next to health, money is the most important thing.” 
The measure used in our study represents the percentage of 
community respondents who indicated that they agree with 
that statement. We interpret higher values on this variable 
to reflect a stronger commitment by community members 
to pursuing activities directed at maximizing monetary 
success. The degree of weak commitment to legitimate 
means for pursuing monetary success goals is measured by 
aggregating, within sample units, responses to a GSS item 
that assesses whether respondents agree with the statement 
that “there are no right or wrong ways to make money, 
only hard and easy ways.” The measure used in our analy-
sis reflects the percentage of persons who agree with this 
statement, and we interpret higher scores on this measure 
as being reflective of a weaker commitment by community 
members to pursue monetary success through legitimate 
means. On the basis of the theoretical discussion outlined 
above, if anomie has a role in explaining variation in lethal 
violence, we would expect the greatest levels of homicide 
to be experienced in sample jurisdictions in which there is 
a relatively high level of commitment to monetary suc-
cess goals and a relatively weak commitment to legitimate 
means, a situation we would label as an unbalanced pecuni-
ary value complex.
We use the two measures just described to form a product 
term where higher values represent a more highly unbal-
anced pecuniary value system. As elaborated below, an 
important step in assessing our mediation hypotheses is 
to test for an effect of this product term on homicide and 
the proposed mediators—firearm prevalence, illicit drug 
activity, and property crime. In doing so, we test both for 
4 The strength of this relationship is weaker than 
the correlations presented by Fryer et al. (2006) 
for cocaine/heroin arrest rates and cocaine death 
rates across relatively large social aggregates 
in America. This may be because our sample 
contains a more diverse mix of areas, including 
relatively small non-metropolitan counties. 
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a possible “main effect” of our indicator of an unbalanced 
pecuniary value system and for several interaction effects 
that evaluate the moderating role of the social structural 
elements emphasized in the anomie theories articulated 
by Merton (1938) and Messner and Rosenfeld (2007). To 
reiterate, Merton (1938) suggested that an insufficient stock 
of opportunities suitable for members of the population 
to pursue monetary success goals and the degree to which 
available opportunities fail to yield achievement of mon-
etary success for all may amplify the criminogenic effects 
of an unbalanced pecuniary value system. Messner and 
Rosenfeld (2007) argued that stronger commitments to and 
investments in non-economic social institutions may miti-
gate the likelihood of illegitimate responses to an unbal-
anced pecuniary value system. Given these arguments, we 
incorporate measures aimed at capturing variation across 
social collectivities in the availability of legitimate opportu-
nities for pursuing monetary goals, the degree of economic 
achievement, and the strength of educational, familial, 
political, religious, and community social institutions. The 
specific measures are summarized in Appendix A and de-
scribed more fully by Baumer and Gustafson (2007).
2.3.4. Control Variables
We also include in our analysis several measures directed 
at capturing key concepts emphasized in some of the most 
prominent alternative aggregate-level theoretical perspec-
tives (e.g., routine activities theory, social disorganization 
theory) as well as other known correlates of crime (e.g., 
Kopsowa, Breault, and Harrison, 1995; Land, McCall, and 
Cohen, 1990). These control variables include time spent 
watching television, population structure, police officers per 
capita, age structure, structural disadvantage, and regional 
location. For a thorough discussion of the rationale for the 
inclusion of these variables and for further details about the 
sources from which they were drawn and how they were 
constructed, see Baumer and Gustafson (2007). We briefly 
summarize the specific measures used in Appendix A, but 
to conserve space and maintain focus on key coefficients of 
interest, we omit the control variables from the other tables 
(results available upon request). 
2.4. Analytical Strategy
We use OLS regression to examine the effects of the explan-
atory and control variables on instrumental crime rates.5 
Our analysis proceeds in the following manner. We begin 
by briefly describing descriptive statistics and bivariate 
correlations for the sample and measures employed in the 
study. We then estimate a series of multivariate regression 
models that examine the empirical predictions outlined 
above. Our initial focus in the regression analysis is on 
examining whether homicide rates are significantly higher 
in areas with a high level of commitment to monetary goals 
and a low level of weak commitment to using legitimate 
means for pursuing monetary success, which we test by 
incorporating a two-way interaction term that reflects the 
product of these two indicators. The empirical expectation 
is for a statistically significant positive coefficient for the 
interaction term. The next stage of our analysis involves 
testing whether any observed effect of this two-way interac-
tion term (i.e., our indicator of unbalanced pecuniary value 
commitments) on homicide is mediated by the indicators of 
firearm prevalence, illicit drug use and drug market activi-
ty, and property crime rates, as suggested earlier. Technical-
ly, our analysis represents an example of a complex form of 
mediation (mediated moderation), but standard procedures 
for assessing mediation remain appropriate (see MacKin-
non, Fairchild, and Fritz 2007). Specifically, after establish-
ing whether the interaction term representing unbalanced 
pecuniary value commitments is associated with homicide, 
5 We tested for normality and homoscedasticity of 
error variance in the homicide models using stan-
dard diagnostic tests. These tests revealed no major 
deviations from normality among the residuals. A 
plot of the residuals against the fitted values revealed 
no signs of significant heteroscedasticity, but the 
two formal tests we applied (White’s test and the 
Breusch-Pagan test) yielded inconsistent evidence 
and suggested the possibility of mild heteroscedastic-
ity in our data. We thus estimated models in OLS 
with and without a correction for heteroscedasticity 
(the HC3 estimator) and we estimated all the models 
of interest using negative binomial regression. In 
each case, the estimated parameters were very similar 
and the substantive conclusions were identical. We 
therefore present the unadjusted OLS results below. 
We also assessed the potential ill effects of multicol-
linearity by inspecting closely standard errors across 
models as well as standard diagnostics The VIFs and 
tolerance levels associated with the models displayed 
below were well within the acceptable range.
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we examine whether this interaction term exerts significant 
effects on the hypothesized mediating variables and then 
we compare its estimated effects on homicide in models 
that include and exclude the mediators. An additional issue 
we examine in this process is whether the magnitude of 
the effects of our indicator of unbalanced pecuniary value 
commitments on homicide, property crime, illicit drug 
activity, and firearm prevalence is conditioned by social 
structural conditions such as the availability of legitimate 
opportunities, absolute and relative levels of economic and 
educational achievement, and the strength of non-economic 
social institutions. This analysis involves testing for three-
way statistical interactions (e.g., commitment to monetary 
success X weak commitment to legitimate means X avail-
ability of legitimate opportunities). Finally, we also evalu-
ate whether any observed tendency for the three potential 
mediating variables in our analysis—property crime, illicit 
drug activity, and firearm prevalence—to elevate homicide 
rates is amplified in the context of a high degree of commit-
ment to monetary goals and a weak commitment to using 
legitimate means to do so. This analysis also involves testing 
for possible three-way interactions, in this case between 
the proposed mediators and our indicator of unbalanced 
pecuniary value commitments.6 
3. Results
Before turning to the regression results, it is instructive to 
consider the descriptive statistics for the key variables repre-
sented in our hypotheses, presented here in Table 1. The 
average homicide rate for the seventy-four areas represented 
in our sample is 8.20 per 100,000 residents, which is very 
similar to the national rate for this period. There is con-
siderable geographic variation in homicide rates, however, 
with a few of the smaller non-metro areas experiencing 
no homicides and other areas experiencing more than 20 
homicides per 100,000. 
Many of the explanatory variables exhibit comparable 
variability across the geographic areas in our sample. For 
instance, on average, 21 percent of all households in the 
areas reported that there was a pistol in their residence, but 
this varied from 0 to 46 percent. Also, more than a quar-
ter (29.6 percent) of persons across these areas agreed that 
“next to health, money is the most important thing,” which 
we use as an indicator of relative commitment to monetary 
success, but this sentiment varied across places from about 
15 percent to 49 percent. Similarly, on average, nearly one-
quarter (23.3 percent) of persons expressed a weak commit-
ment to using legitimate means to pursue monetary success 
as indicated by their agreement that “there are no right 
or wrong ways to make money, only hard and easy ways,” 
but agreement with this statement ranged from under 5 
percent to more than 41 percent across our sample areas. 
The indicators of the availability of employment opportuni-
ties, economic attainment and inequality, and commitment 
to and participation in non-economic institutions exhibit 
substantial variability across places as well. It remains to 
be seen, however, whether these factors affect instrumental 
crime in the manner posited by Merton and by Messner 
and Rosenfeld.
6 To enhance the interpretability of the interac-
tions estimated in our regression models, each 
of the predictor variables hypothesized to form 
multiplicative relationships was mean centered 
(Aiken and West 1991; Jaccard and Turrisi 2003). 
233IJCV : Vol. 2 (2) 2008, pp. 215 – 247Brian J. Stults, and Eric P. Baumer: Assessing the Relevance of Anomie Theory for Explaining Spatial Variation
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for dependent variable and explanatory variables (N=74)
Dependent variable Mean SD
Homicide rate (per 100,000)  8.20  5.69
Mediating variables
Firearm prevalencea  0.00  1.87
% of suicides committed with firearm  58.37  17.83
% of households with pistol  21.56  10.37
Drug arrest rate (per 100,000)  227.72  148.12
Drug mortality rate (per 100,000)  -0.18  1.20
Property crime rate (per 100,000)  5,466.37  1,929.13
Explanatory variables
Value commitments
Commitment to monetary success  29.61  8.10
% agreeing that next to health, money is most important
Weak commitment to legitimate means  23.29  7.73
% agreeing there are no right or wrong ways to make money
Social structural position
Limited job availability  0.97  0.09
Low educational and economic attainmenta  0.00  4.23
Educational and income inequalitya  0.00  1.78
Strength of non-economic social institutions
Educational
% government expenditures on education  50.46  7.66
Pupils per teacher  21.09  5.38
Familial
Time spent with familya  0.00  2.49
Commitment to marriagea  0.00  1.70
Political
Voter participationa  0.00  1.91
Welfare assistancea  0.00  1.71
Religious
Civically engaged church adherence rate  19.41  9.19
Community
Social capitala  0.00  3.26
aMulti-item standardized additive scale.
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We display correlations between the key variables in Table 
2. As noted by Baumer and Gustafson (2007), there is a 
significant positive, albeit relatively weak, linear relation-
ship between levels of commitment to monetary success 
and weak commitment to legitimate means (r=.265, p < .05). 
Neither of these variables exhibits a significant linear asso-
ciation with homicide rates. This is perhaps not surprising 
in light of the strong emphasis in classic and contemporary 
anomie theories on their presumed interactive effects, an 
issue that will be explored in the multivariate analysis. For 
the same reason, it is perhaps not surprising that neither 
of these commitment measures is independently related to 
the hypothesized mediating variables—firearm prevalence, 
drug arrest rates and drug mortality rates, and property 
crime rates. However, it is notable that each hypothesized 
mediating variable exhibits a statistically significant moder-
ate association with the homicide rate. This provides some 
initial favorable evidence that these indicators could serve 
as meaningful ways to link anomie theory, and in particular 
an unbalanced pecuniary value system, to lethal criminal 
violence. Finally, many of the other explanatory variables 
emphasized in prior research and theory, including indica-
tors of non-economic institutional strength highlighted in 
IAT, yield significant negative relationships with homicide 
rates. 
Table 2: Bivariate correlations for dependent and explanatory variables (N=74)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
(1) Homicide rate 1.000
(2) Firearm prevalence 0.332* 1.000
(3) Drug arrest rate 0.496* 0.136 1.000
(4) Drug mortality rate 0.290* -0.121 0.346* 1.000
(5) Property crime rate 0.495* -0.003 0.526* 0.529* 1.000
(6) Commitment to  
  monetary success
0.127 -0.045 0.038 0.047 0.124* 1.000
(7) Weak comm. to  
  legitimate means
-0.086 -0.089 -0.098 -0.158 -0.080 0.265* 1.000
(8) Limited job availability 0.024 -0.177 0.149 0.128 -0.051 0.200 0.231 1.000
(9) Low educational and  
  economic attainment 
0.171 0.361* -0.033 -0.080 -0.382* 0.055 -0.105 0.257* 1.000
(10) Educational and  
  income ineqality
0.264* 0.273* 0.137 -0.031 -0.222 0.149 0.049 0.183 0.699* 1.000
(11) % government  
  expenditure on education
-0.135 0.180 -0.248* -0.116* -0.467* -0.003 0.012 0.154 0.488* 0.373* 1.000
(12) Pupils per teacher 0.031 0.306* 0.083 -0.131 0.003 0.013 -0.086 -0.019 0.011 -0.034 -0.236* 1.000
(13) Time spent with family 0.106 0.219 -0.233* -0.239* -0.442* 0.013 -0.030 0.082 0.613* 0.447* 0.390* 0.083 1.000
(14) Commitment to marriage -0.267* 0.280* -0.307* -0.439* -0.667* -0.082 -0.024 0.022 0.485* 0.243* 0.387* 0.100 0.366* 1.000
(15) Voter participation -0.297* -0.274* -0.183 -0.081 -0.200 -0.146 0.023 -0.147 -0.076 -0.183 0.104 -0.097 -0.085 0.309* 1.000
(16) Welfare assistance -0.071 -0.146 0.013 0.045 -0.240* 0.048 -0.143 0.085 0.632* 0.444* 0.144 -0.067 0.413* 0.256* 0.112 1.000
(17) Church adherence rate -0.430* 0.034 -0.406* -0.550* -0.567* -0.164 0.077 -0.312* -0.024 -0.117 0.145 -0.077 0.138 0.497* 0.296* -0.097 1.000
(18) Social capital -0.561* -0.352* -0.282* -0.189* -0.125 -0.164 -0.031 -0.286* -0.350* -0.407* -0.045 -0.125 -0.257* 0.217 0.449* -0.027 0.408* 1.000
* p < .05, two-tailed test          
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3.1. Direct Effects of Unbalanced Pecuniary Value Commitments
The first stage of our multivariate analysis involves evaluat-
ing the effect of unbalanced pecuniary value commitments 
on homicide rates while controlling for other relevant fac-
tors. This is substantively interesting itself, and it also allows 
us to determine whether there is an effect of an unbalanced 
value complex on homicide that might be explained by 
variation in the hypothesized mediating variables. The first 
column of Table 3 provides unstandardized OLS coefficients 
and standard errors for such a model. 












Commitment to monetary success X 0.018* 0.001 0.695* 0.002 11.106**
Weak commitment to legitimate means (0.008) (0.003) (0.303) (0.002) (2.443)
Commitment to monetary success -0.107 0.0002 -1.961 0.002 17.693
(0.060) (0.019) (2.250) (0.017) (18.161)
Weak commitment to legitimate means 0.055 0.009 0.474 -0.014 40.270
(0.070) (0.023) (2.615) (0.020) (21.104)
Limited job availability -7.117 -5.004* 123.192 -0.507 -2275.441
(6.049) (1.953) (225.592) (1.705) (1820.603)
Low educational and economic attainment 0.408 0.069 -10.259 0.072 37.182
(0.248) (0.080) (9.247) (0.070) (74.624)
Educational and income inequality -0.447 -0.260 -17.151 -0.057 -298.870*
(0.463) (0.150) (17.266) (0.130) (139.345)
% Government expenditures on education -0.186* -0.004 -3.948 -0.004 -85.071**
(0.072) (0.023) (2.667) (0.020) (21.523)
Pupils per teacher -0.109 0.059* 1.948 -0.025 -15.974
(0.084) (0.027) (3.127) (0.024) (25.238)
Time spent with family -0.549* -0.166* -26.195** -0.122 -220.613**
(0.252) (0.082) (9.416) (0.071) (75.987)
Commitment to marriage 0.674 0.293* 3.090 -0.083 -250.109*
(0.407) (0.131) (15.184) (0.115) (122.543)
Voter participation 0.142 -0.090 1.076 0.073 128.495
(0.273) (0.088) (10.200) (0.077) (82.317)
Welfare assistance -0.277 -0.258 32.616 0.134 97.068
(0.447) (0.144) (16.679) (0.126) (134.603)
Civically engaged church adherence rate -0.071 -0.011 -3.318 -0.033 -59.093**
(0.070) (0.023) (2.607) (0.020) (21.042)
Social capital -0.409* -0.122 -6.817 -0.017 66.363
(0.201) (0.065) (7.496) (0.057) (60.498)
R2 0.649 .661 .278 .370 .723
*p < .05, two-tailed test.  Note: Estimates shown are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.   
The control variables also were included in the estimation of the models shown.
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The results show that several of the explanatory variables 
exert significant effects on homicide rates. Net of other 
factors, homicide rates were lower in the late 1970s in U.S. 
geographic areas where education comprised a larger share 
of overall spending, families spent more time together, and 
levels of social capital were higher. Also, consistent with 
past research, one of the control variables (the indicator of 
resource deprivation, a scale that combines percent black 
and percentage of families headed by a female) exerts a 
strong positive effect on homicide rates (not shown). Most 
importantly given the focus of our research, after control-
ling for many other factors we observe in Model 1 a sta-
tistically significant interaction effect for the variable that 
represents the product of levels of commitment to monetary 
success goals and weak commitment to legitimate means 
for pursuing monetary goals (b=.018, p < .05). This interac-
tion effect is in the theoretically expected direction; includ-
ing it yields a significant improvement in model fit com-
pared with a model that excludes it, and the magnitude of 
the interaction is non-trivial. For example, setting the other 
variables to their sample means, Model 1 yields a predicted 
homicide rate in areas with very high levels of commitment 
to monetary success and very low levels of commitment to 
legitimate means (i.e., 2 standard deviations above the mean 
on these variables) that is about 44 percent higher than the 
predicted rate in areas with low levels of commitment to 
monetary success and strong commitment to legitimate 
means (9.74 homicides per 100,000 compared to 6.77 per 
100,000).
The remaining four models in Table 3 regress each of the 
hypothesized mediating variables on the explanatory and 
control variables used in the previous model. A significant 
effect of unbalanced pecuniary value commitments on 
these variables will suggest the potential for mediation in 
the relationship between anomie and homicide. Indeed, we 
find that two of the four mediating variables—drug arrest 
rate and property crime rate—are significantly influenced 
by unbalanced value commitments. These effects are in the 
expected direction, such that areas with unbalanced value 
commitments tend to have higher rates of drug arrests and 
property crime. However, we find no evidence that unbal-
anced value commitments lead to higher rates of drug mor-
tality or firearm prevalence. In fact, none of the explanatory 
variables listed in the table is significantly related to the 
drug mortality rate, though one of the control variables 
that we do not include in the table—police per capita—does 
exert a significant effect at conventional levels and several 
other variables considered (e.g., time with family, civically 
engaged church adherence, and population structure) yield 
theoretically expected effects that attain significance using a 
one-tailed test. 
3.2. Indirect Effects of Unbalanced Pecuniary Values on Lethal Violence
The significant positive effect on homicide of our indica-
tor of unbalanced pecuniary value commitments reported 
in Table 3 suggests that classic and contemporary anomie 
theories are relevant to explanations of lethal criminal vio-
lence, but as noted above, why would unbalanced monetary 
value commitments in an area translate into a higher rate 
of homicide given that only a modest proportion of crimes 
motivated by financial interests directly lead to murder? 
We explore three possible avenues in the regression models 
displayed in Table 4 where we regress homicide rates on the 
same set of variables as shown in the previous tables along 
with each of the potential mediating variables added one-
by-one in subsequent models and then simultaneously in a 
final summary model. For ease of comparison, we display 
in Model 1 of Table 4 the results reported in Table 3 for the 
significant positive effect on homicide of our indicator of 
unbalanced pecuniary value commitments. The other four 
regression models reported in Table 4 are relevant to assess-
ing whether this effect can be explained by firearm preva-
lence (Model 2), illicit drug use and drug market activity 
(Model 3), property crime (Model 4), or a combination of 
these factors (Model 5). 
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Table 4: Regression of homicide rates on firearm prevalence, illicit drug activity,  property crime, unbalanced pecuniary value commitments, and other factors (N=74)
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Commitment to monetary success X 0.018* 0.018* 0.011 0.005 0.002
Weak commitment to legitimate means (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Firearm prevalence -- 0.270 -- -- -0.015
-- (0.428) -- -- (0.392)
Drug arrest rate -- -- 0.012* -- 0.009
-- -- (0.003) -- (0.004)
Drug mortality rate -- -- -0.287 -- -0.444
-- -- (0.451) -- (0.448)
Property crime -- -- -- 0.001* 0.001*
-- -- -- (0.0004) (0.0004)
Commitment to monetary success -0.107 -0.107 -0.084 -0.128* -0.104
(0.060) (0.061) (0.056) (0.057) (0.055)
Weak commitment to legitimate means 0.055 0.053 0.046 0.007 0.007
(0.070) (0.071) (0.065) (0.068) (0.066)
Limited job availability -7.117 -5.767 -8.689 -4.375 -6.474
(6.049) (6.449) (5.586) (5.774) (5.866)
Low educational and economic attainment 0.408 0.389 0.548* 0.363 0.503*
(0.248) (0.251) (0.234) (0.234) (0.231)
Educational and income inequality -0.447 -0.377 -0.265 -0.087 -0.039
(0.463) (0.479) (0.430) (0.454) (0.441)
% Government expenditures on education -0.186* -0.185* -0.142* -0.084 -0.072
(0.072) (0.072) (0.067) (0.077) (0.074)
Pupils per teacher -0.109 -0.125 -0.139 -0.090 -0.123
(0.084) (0.088) (0.078) (0.079) (0.081)
Time spent with family -0.549* -0.504 -0.280 -0.283 -0.155
(0.252) (0.264) (0.253) (0.256) (0.257)
Commitment to marriage 0.674 0.595 0.614 0.976* 0.844*
(0.407) (0.428) (0.377) (0.398) (0.405)
Voter participation 0.142 0.166 0.150 -0.013 0.044
(0.273) (0.278) (0.254) (0.263) (0.257)
Welfare assistance -0.277 -0.207 -0.616 -0.394 -0.618
(0.447) (0.463) (0.429) (0.423) (0.436)
Civically engaged church adherence rate -0.071 -0.068 -0.042 0.000 0.000
(0.070) (0.070) (0.067) (0.070) (0.068)
Social capital -0.409* -0.376 -0.335 -0.489* -0.416*
(0.201) (0.209) (0.186) (0.191) (0.192)
R2 0.649 0.645 0.703 0.689 0.716
*p < .05, two-tailed test.  Note: Estimates shown are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.   
The control variables also were included in the estimation of the models shown.
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We find no evidence that firearm prevalence is associ-
ated with elevated homicide rates or that it explains any 
of the observed effects of the variable designed to gauge 
unbalanced pecuniary value commitments (Model 2). This 
conclusion persists in supplementary analyses in which we 
substitute (one by one and simultaneously) the two individ-
ual measures of firearm prevalence for the composite index 
shown in the table. We also reach the same conclusion from 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) models in which, following 
past research, we use exclusionary restrictions (percentage 
of residents who are hunters, levels of conservatism, per-
centage of residents who have served in the military) as an 
instrument for firearm prevalence (Kleck 2008; Rosenfeld, 
Baumer, and Messner 2007). 
In Model 3 we see that one of the indicators of illicit drug 
activity—the drug arrest rate—exerts a statistically signifi-
cant effect on homicide rates (b=.012, p < .05), a finding that 
is consistent with other recent studies in the United States 
(Baumer et al. 1998; Baumer 2008; Ousey and Lee 2004). 
Also, after adding drug arrest rates to the model the coef-
ficient for the product term representing differences in un-
balanced pecuniary value commitments falls by more then 
one-third and drops below conventional levels of statistical 
significance. Unsettled questions about the validity of drug 
arrest rates as an indicator of illicit drug market activity and 
drug use vs. police activity, coupled with possible endoge-
neity concerns with the link between drug arrest rates and 
homicide, should serve as reminders to be cautious in draw-
ing strong conclusions from these results. Nevertheless, the 
findings suggest that one reason a high level of commitment 
to monetary success goals and weak commitment to legiti-
mate means may translate into higher homicide rates is that 
it stimulates participation in illicit drug markets.
We assess the mediational role of property crime rates 
in Model 4. As expected, the indicator of property crime 
exhibits a statistically significant positive effect on homi-
cide rates (b=.001, p < .05). The unstandardized coefficient 
is relatively small because of scaling, but evaluating the 
standardized coefficients (not shown) reveals that property 
crime rates exert the second strongest effect on homicide 
among the variables considered (the resource deprivation 
control variable has the strongest effect). And, consistent 
with expectations, property crime rates account for more 
than two-thirds of the observed main effect of the interac-
tion term for commitment to monetary success and weak 
commitment to legitimate means, an interaction that is no 
longer statistically significant once property crime rates are 
incorporated. This is consistent with the idea that an unbal-
anced pecuniary value complex elevates lethal violence 
because it stimulates involvement in property crimes that 
can directly or indirectly lead to homicides.
We add all the hypothesized mediators in Model 5, and the 
conclusions mirror those drawn in the previous models. In 
this specification, we again see that of the proposed media-
tors, only drug arrest rates and property crime rates are 
significantly associated with homicide rates. These effects 
are in the expected direction and they result in a substantial 
attenuation (more than 80 percent) of the coefficient for 
the product term capturing the central tenet of classic and 
contemporary anomie theories as we have interpreted them: 
the interactive effect of a strong commitment to monetary 
success and a weak commitment to legitimate means. These 
findings contradict claims that “crime is not the problem” 
(Zimring and Hawkins 1997). Indeed, crime levels as mea-
sured by property crime rates and drug arrest rates emerge 
in our study as an important consideration in explaining 
cross-sectional variation in lethal violence and in helping 
to describe possible linkages between core anomie concepts 
and lethal violence.
3.3. Social Structural Moderation of Unbalanced Pecuniary Values
As described above, both Merton (1938) and Messner and 
Rosenfeld (2007) argue that certain social structural condi-
tions may moderate the tendency for a higher degree of 
imbalance in pecuniary value commitments to translate 
into a higher prevalence of what these theorists refer to 
as “innovative” behaviors, which would include property 
crime, involvement in illegal drug markets, and under some 
conditions the acquisition of firearms. Evaluating these 
arguments is of considerable theoretical importance in its 
own right but, in addition, if significant moderation of this 
form is found it has potentially important implications for 
our assessment of the amount of mediation we attribute to 
the hypothesized mediators and it would alter estimates 
of the magnitude of both direct and indirect effects of 
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unbalanced pecuniary values on homicide.7 To explore 
this possibility, we estimated several additional models 
with homicide and the hypothesized mediators treated as 
outcome variables. These models examined whether effects 
observed for the two-way interaction between commitment 
to monetary success and weak commitment to legitimate 
means are conditioned by the three indicators of relevance 
to Merton’s theoretical arguments about how an insufficient 
and unequally distributed supply of legitimate opportuni-
ties may amplify the effects of unbalanced pecuniary values 
(i.e., limited job availability, low educational and economic 
attainment, and educational and income inequality) and 
the eight indicators geared toward capturing Messner and 
Rosenfeld’s arguments about how a higher level of commit-
ment to and investment in non-economic social institutions 
might dampen such effects (e.g., government spending on 
education, pupils per teacher, time with family, commit-
ment to marriage, voter participation, welfare assistance, 
civically engaged church adherence, and social capital). We 
began this assessment by re-estimating the homicide equa-
tion displayed in Model 5 of Table 4 several times, adding to 
the model the implied two- and three-way interaction terms 
needed to evaluate whether the social structural indica-
tors condition the effects of unbalanced pecuniary value 
commitments. We did this separately for each of the social 
structure variables, a process that yielded eleven additional 
homicide models. We then repeated this process for the 
other outcomes (firearm prevalence, illicit drug activity, 
and property crime).8 Showing the results of these analyses 
(forty-four models overall) in tabular form would require a 
substantial amount of space, so we briefly summarize them 
and their implications in the text. In general, the dominant 
story that emerges from these analyses is that we found 
few instances of significant moderation of our indicator of 
unbalanced pecuniary value commitments. However, we 
highlight more specifically four noteworthy patterns that 
emerged from this portion of our analysis.
First, we found no evidence that the indicators of social 
structure considered in our study moderate the effects 
of unbalanced pecuniary value commitments on rates of 
homicide. These findings hold both with and without the 
proposed mediators in the model. This is an important 
finding with regard to our primary goal of evaluating the 
mediating role of gun prevalence, illicit drugs markets, and 
property crime, as it suggests that our assessment of the 
extent to which these factors mediate the effect on homicide 
of an unbalanced pecuniary value system is not influenced 
by the elements of social structure examined. These null re-
sults could be due to the difficulties associated with detect-
ing higher-order interactions in non-experimental research 
(see McLelland and Judd 1993), but the evidence generated 
by the data at hand suggests that the social structural con-
ditioning influences implied in classic and contemporary 
anomie theories do not operate for homicide, at least not 
directly. However, as we elaborate below, some of these fac-
tors have relevance for homicide indirectly.
Second, using a slightly smaller sample and more expansive 
empirical specification, we replicated the results for prop-
erty crime reported in Baumer and Gustafson (2007). They 
showed that the positive effect of a high level of commit-
ment to monetary goals paired with a weak commitment to 
legitimate means on property crime rates was not ampli-
fied under conditions of fewer available jobs, low levels of 
economic achievement, or high levels of inequality, but that 
this effect was significantly dampened by higher levels of 
welfare assistance and greater amounts of time spent with 
family members. Although the magnitude of the significant 
three-way interaction effects observed in our study was 
slightly smaller, we found the same pattern in our analysis, 
providing further support for Messner and Rosenfeld’s 
institutional anomie theory. 
7 To elaborate: if the effect of our indicator of unbal-
anced pecuniary value commitments on homicide 
rates is moderated by the social structural factors 
emphasized in the classic and contemporary anomie 
theories under review, our estimate of the amount 
of mediation would be contingent on values of those 
moderating variables. Also, if certain factors signifi-
cantly moderate the effects of unbalanced pecuniary 
value commitments on the hypothesized mediating 
variables, estimates of indirect effects of such value 
commitments on homicide would be contingent on 
values of those factors (MacKinnon et al. 2007).
8 To account for the multiple testing in-
volved in these assessments, we adjusted the 
conventional alpha level of .05 using the pro-
cedures for multiple independent tests out-
lined by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995).
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Third, in modeling the drug arrest rate we found a statisti-
cally significant effect for a three-way interaction term that 
combines our two indicator term for unbalanced pecuni-
ary value commitments with the indicator of low levels of 
educational and economic achievement. Consistent with in-
sights drawn from Merton, this suggests that the observed 
positive effect of unbalanced pecuniary value commitments 
on participation in illegal drug markets (measured with 
drug arrest rates) is significantly stronger when large seg-
ments of a population are not realizing legitimate monetary 
success. 
Fourth, although we observed no significant main effect 
of unbalanced pecuniary value commitments on firearm 
prevalence (Table 3), we found that this effect was signifi-
cantly moderated by the availability of jobs and time spent 
with family. Specifically, consistent with Merton (1938), the 
results revealed a statistically significant positive effect for a 
three-way interaction term that combines commitment to 
monetary success, weak commitment to legitimate means, 
and the indicator of limited job availability. The results 
imply that unbalanced pecuniary value commitments 
yield a higher prevalence of firearms primarily when the 
labor market is particularly tight. In line with Messner and 
Rosenfeld’s institutional anomie theory (2007), we also find 
a significant negative three-way interaction involving the 
two indicators of value commitments and the indicator of 
time spent socializing with family. This finding parallels the 
patterns observed for property crime and suggests that the 
tendency for a high level of commitment to monetary suc-
cess and a low level of commitment to legitimate means to 
translate into higher levels of firearm ownership is signifi-
cantly dampened in areas where families spend more time 
together. 
Overall, these results reveal patterns that are meaning-
ful for general assessments of the relevance of classic and 
contemporary theoretical arguments about how features 
of the social structure may condition the likelihood of “in-
novative” behavioral responses to an unbalanced pecuni-
ary value system. We found no evidence that the direct 
effect of unbalanced pecuniary value commitments on 
homicide was significantly moderated by elements of the 
social structure, which renders our assessment of mediation 
unchanged. However, our results do suggest that the effects 
of this value complex on property crime and involvement in 
illegal drug markets—the two factors we find to be associ-
ated with homicide rates—are conditioned by some of the 
social structural conditions emphasized in classic and con-
temporary anomie theories (namely, the availability of jobs, 
time spent with family, and welfare assistance). This reveals 
one way in which these elements of the social structure are 
relevant for lethal violence, and from a practical standpoint 
it means that the overall magnitude of the indirect effect of 
the indicator of unbalanced pecuniary value commitments 
on homicide will vary depending on the prevalence of these 
factors. 
3.4. Unbalanced Pecuniary Values and the Am-
plification of Lethal Violence
We now turn to a final issue that we feel is important to a 
full assessment of the relevance of anomie theory to lethal 
violence. Specifically, we examine whether an unbalanced 
pecuniary value complex amplifies the degree to which 
higher levels of firearm prevalence, illicit drug activity, 
and property crime translate into lethal violence. As noted 
earlier, in many ways the use of lethal violence is an extreme 
example of pursuing prescribed monetary goals “by any 
means necessary” and thus, we would expect the pres-
ence of firearms and involvement in property crime and 
illegal drug markets to more often yield lethal outcomes 
in contexts where there is a greater pecuniary value imbal-
ance. This implies three-way statistical interaction effects on 
homicide involving each of the hypothesized moderating 
variables and our two indicators of value commitments. We 
tested for these effects by re-estimating Model 5 of Table 4 
several times after adding the implied three-way interaction 
terms and corresponding lower-level interaction terms. The 
results of these models (not shown in tabular form) can be 
described succinctly: although the relevant coefficients are 
uniformly in the right direction, we find no evidence that 
the effects on homicide of firearm prevalence, illicit drug 
activity, and property crime rates are statistically contin-
gent on the level of commitment to monetary success and 
legitimate means. 
In supplementary analyses (not shown), we also considered 
a broader set of possible moderator variables of the gun, 
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drug, and property crime effects. We were motivated to 
do so because it appears that within the United States and 
cross-nationally there are contexts in which guns, drugs, 
and property crime are much more likely to translate 
into lethal violence than elsewhere (Zimring 2006). Thus, 
Europe has property crime rates that are similar to rates of 
property crime observed in the United States, yet much low-
er levels of lethal violence. Although less well documented, 
illicit drug markets in Europe also appear to generate much 
less violence than American drug markets. These interest-
ing patterns stimulated us to evaluate in our data whether 
high levels of economic stress or firearm prevalence raise 
the proclivity of drug markets and widespread property 
crime to generate lethal violence. In only one instance did 
we detect a statistically significant interaction of this type: 
property crime exhibits a significantly stronger effect on ho-
micide rates when achievement levels are depressed. Other 
dimensions of economic stress (e.g., inequality and poverty) 
or other factors (e.g., police numbers) do not play this type 
of moderating role in our data. 
4. Discussion and Conclusion
In recent years, efforts to explain variation in crime rates 
across social collectivities as a function of anomic social 
conditions have led to a growing number of empirical tests 
of classic and contemporary anomie theories. Despite a 
strong emphasis in the theoretical literature on explaining 
instrumental, money-generating crime, much of the empiri-
cal literature has examined variation in levels of homicide, 
with little justification for expanding the scope conditions 
to include lethal violence. Certainly some proportion of 
all homicides are economically motivated, and thus fall 
squarely within the stated scope of anomie theories, but 
these instrumental homicides comprise a small share of 
total homicides by most accounts. Yet, prior research does 
find a significant link between various indicators of anomie 
and homicide rates, which suggests that an expansion of the 
scope conditions of anomie theories to include homicide 
may be feasible.
The purpose of the current study was to identify and em-
pirically test several potential ways in which an unbalanced 
pecuniary value system may influence spatial variation in 
levels of lethal violence. Our initial results indicated that 
homicide rates tend to be higher in areas where a strong 
commitment to monetary success is paired with a weak 
commitment to legitimate means, even after controlling 
for a broad array of characteristics identified by various 
theoretical perspectives as predictive of homicide. However, 
after introducing several theoretically meaningful inter-
vening mechanisms, we no longer found a direct effect of 
this unbalanced value system on rates of lethal violence. 
Specifically, we found that drug arrest and property crime 
rates reduced this effect by more than 80 percent and 
rendered it non-significant. We believe that although these 
indirect pathways are not explicitly identified in either 
classic or contemporary versions of anomie theory, they are 
nonetheless consistent with their core arguments, includ-
ing the likelihood of criminal innovation in response to the 
pressures of achieving monetary success, and a willingness 
to use any means necessary to achieve material goals. These 
findings suggest an important elaboration of the anomie 
perspective by identifying the ways in which an unbalanced 
pecuniary value system can lead to increased homicide 
rates, thus providing an explicit justification for expand-
ing the scope of anomie theory to include levels of lethal 
violence.
Our other expectations regarding the persistence of a direct 
effect of an unbalanced set of value commitments, the 
mediating influence of gun prevalence, and the moderating 
roles of drug markets, gun prevalence, and property crimes 
were not supported. Not only was there an absence of 
evidence that gun prevalence mediates the effect of unbal-
anced pecuniary value commitments on homicide rates, 
there was in fact no significant role of firearm prevalence 
anywhere in the causal chain. This is perhaps not surprising 
given the mixed results in extensive prior research examin-
ing the link between guns and homicide (Kleck 1991). Kates 
and Polsby (2000), for example, explain that during much 
of the period between 1973 and 1999, which includes the 
years of our study, the United States experienced a dramatic 
increase in firearm prevalence but a stable or decreasing 
homicide rate. Even when firearm availability and homicide 
rates do trend in the same direction, several explanations 
have been offered that contradict the claim of a recursive 
causal link from guns to lethal violence (Southwick 1997; 
Kleck, Kovandzic, and Schaffer 2005; Lott 2000).
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In addition to the possibility that there is simply not a 
causal link between gun prevalence and homicide, and 
thus no potential for it to mediate the effect of unbalanced 
value commitments on homicide, we suggest an alterna-
tive explanation for the absence of a significant role of gun 
prevalence. Prior research has found that criminals typi-
cally acquire guns through transactions in the secondary 
market or by stealing them (Wright and Rossi 1986; Zawitz 
1995; Sheley and Wright 1993). Thus, a substantial propor-
tion of crime guns are initially purchased through legal 
primary markets, and then make their way through a series 
of transactions and events into the hands of criminals. This 
would seem to support the validity of a survey-based mea-
sure of household gun ownership as a proxy for measur-
ing the extent to which guns are available for committing 
crime. However, this argument may only be applicable to 
the measurement of gun availability in periods with strict 
gun control laws, such as the 1994 enactment of the Federal 
Assault Weapons Ban and the Brady Act, both of which 
made it more difficult for criminals to acquire guns through 
legal channels. Since our measures of firearm prevalence 
are drawn from a period when there were fewer restrictions 
on the legal purchase of firearms, it is possible that our 
measure may not be strongly associated with the prevalence 
of guns “on the street” (Cohen, Engberg, and Singh 2002; 
Stolzenberg and D’Alessio 2000). Future research might 
examine alternative measures of gun prevalence, perhaps 
restricted to areas in and around illegal drug and property 
crime markets or restricted to younger persons, which 
may better reflect the supply of guns to would-be offend-
ers. Likewise, analyses using more recent data may provide 
different results since measures of household gun owner-
ship and gun-related suicide rates may be more valid proxy 
measures of the prevalence of crime guns in later time 
periods when there were more restrictions on the ability of 
criminals to purchase guns legally.
We also did not find support for our expectation that a 
direct effect of unbalanced pecuniary value commitments 
on homicide rates would persist, although greatly reduced, 
even after controlling for illicit drug market activity, prop-
erty crime, and firearm prevalence. Since anomie theories 
explicitly purport to explain variation in money-generating 
crimes, we expected that including both instrumental and 
expressive forms of homicide in our dependent variable 
would yield both direct and indirect effects of an unbal-
anced value system; any effect of anomic conditions on 
expressive homicide would operate indirectly, and any ef-
fect on instrumental homicide would be direct. The absence 
of a direct effect may provide support for the argument that 
instrumental and expressive forms of homicide are more 
similar to one another than they are unique (Felson 1993; 
Miethe and Drass 1999), but this requires further investi-
gation. Conducting separate analyses for different types 
of homicide is beyond the scope of the current study and 
would present several complications because of the high 
prevalence of missing information in the data system in 
which homicide circumstances are recorded in the United 
States (i.e.,. the Supplementary Homicide Reports) and 
given that many of the smaller areas in our sample did not 
report such data for the period under review, but we see this 
is an important avenue for future research.
Both Merton’s anomie theory (1938) and Messner and 
Rosenfeld’s institutional anomie theory (2007) predict that 
features of the social structure may condition the effects 
on illegal activity of unbalanced pecuniary value com-
mitments. We examined these predictions using available 
indicators of the availability of jobs, absolute and relative 
levels of economic achievement, and non-economic institu-
tional strength. Our analyses suggest that the direct effect 
of an unbalanced pecuniary value complex on homicide 
is not conditioned by these factors. However, we found 
that this value complex is more apt to translate into high 
levels of illegal drug market activity when jobs are scarce 
and less likely to translate into high property crime rates 
when accompanied by more extensive socializing within 
families and greater levels of welfare support. This suggests 
that one heretofore unexamined way that the availability of 
jobs, time spent with family, and the degree of government 
welfare assistance influence homicide rates is by condition-
ing the extent to which unbalanced value commitments 
yield higher rates of instrumental crime (i.e., participation 
in property crime and illegal drug markets). These results 
may have relevance for patterns observed in cross-national 
research on homicide, which has shown that government 
policies that soften the negative consequences of free-
market economies can mitigate the homicidal tendencies 
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of adverse economic conditions and associated pressures 
(Savolainen 2000; Pratt and Godsey 2003; Messner and 
Rosenfeld 1997). Although the extant research has assumed 
that these policies shape homicide in a relatively direct fash-
ion by moderating presumed causes of lethal violence (e.g., 
inequality and other proxies for an unbalanced pecuniary 
value system), it could be instead that they condition the ef-
fects of unbalanced pecuniary value commitments on prop-
erty crime and illegal drug market activity, which in turn 
influence homicide. Future research should explore this is-
sue while also considering the importance of measuring not 
just the strength of noneconomic institutions and the extent 
to which residents are embedded within them, but also the 
variable effect that these institutions may have on serious 
crime depending on whether they have been penetrated by, 
and forced to accommodate, the dominance of the economy 
(Chamlin and Cochran 2007; Messner and Rosenfeld 2005). 
For example, strengthening education as an institution, or 
increasing political participation, may ameliorate the effect 
of unbalanced value commitments by strengthening com-
mitments to legitimate means or by providing alternative 
definitions of success. However, if these institutions have 
been co-opted by the economy as Messner and Rosenfeld 
suggest, strengthening them could actually perpetuate or 
even exacerbate the effect of unbalanced pecuniary value 
commitments.
Another issue we wish to emphasize is that property crime, 
gun prevalence, and illegal drug markets are not inher-
ently violent, as evidenced by their weak association with 
homicide in developed nations outside the United States. 
This suggests the need to explain the conditions under 
which they may translate into elevated levels of lethal 
violence. By evaluating a series of three-way statistical 
interactions, we explored the relevance of anomie theory 
in identifying these conditions. Our expectation that an 
unbalanced pecuniary value system would moderate the 
effects of illicit drug activity, gun prevalence, and property 
crime on homicide rates was not supported empirically. We 
suggest caution, however, in interpreting these results too 
strongly and perhaps prematurely rejecting the possibility 
of conditional effects of guns, drugs, and property crime 
on homicide. Our reluctance is partly due to the challenges 
inherent in detecting moderator effects in observational 
data (McClelland and Judd 1993). Though we did find a sig-
nificant two-way interaction in our initial model showing 
the effect of unbalanced value commitments on homicide 
rates, the difficulty in detecting moderation increases with 
higher-order interactions such as the three-way interactions 
required to estimate the moderating effects that we hypoth-
esized, and this difficulty may be compounded by factors 
such as measurement error and our relatively small sample 
size (Aiken and West 1991).
A final issue that is important to consider in future schol-
arship on anomie theory concerns the relevance of the 
theoretical arguments and empirical relationships across 
different social and cultural contexts. With respect to theo-
retical relevance, in our view the classic and contemporary 
anomie perspectives considered above are general expla-
nations for variation in crime and violence across social 
collectivities, and we see no a priori reason that the causal 
pathways implied in these perspectives would be more or 
less relevant across (i.e., moderated by) different social and 
cultural contexts. But some scholars have asserted other-
wise, suggesting for example that anomie may be relevant 
only in highly developed Western societies (Chamlin and 
Cochran 2007), or in other words that levels of economic 
development might condition the effects of factors such as 
an unbalanced value commitment system. Further theoreti-
cal development of the underlying reasons for these types of 
conditioning effects and others that would predict variation 
across social and cultural contexts in the relevance of the 
causal processes implied in anomie theory would be a use-
ful addition to the literature. 
Even if we conclude that the theoretical relevance of anomie 
theory is not highly contingent on the social context in 
which it is applied, from an empirical standpoint there may 
be reason to believe that analyses that test the core ideas of 
anomie theory vis a vis homicide might yield different find-
ings across different social contexts, including nation-states 
or territories within nations. Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) 
argue that the United States is “exceptional” in the sense 
that rates of serious crime in the United States are strikingly 
higher than in other developed nations, that American 
culture is uniquely characterized by an extreme imbalance 
between cultural pressures for monetary success and a weak 
cultural commitment to using legitimate means, and that 
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the economy dominates and subjugates other social institu-
tions that might otherwise restrain these intense cultural 
pressures for monetary success. Though our empirical 
findings suggests heterogeneity across social collectivities 
within the United States with regard to these core elements 
of anomie theory, perhaps certain aspects of our empirical 
analysis would render different results when applied to the 
widely varying contexts across Europe. For example, one 
of the goals of our analysis was to identify the conditions 
under which high rates of property crime and illicit drug 
crime lead to elevated levels of lethal violence. Our failure 
to detect moderating effects of unbalanced pecuniary value 
commitments may be due to another aspect of “American 
exceptionalism”—a general desensitization to crime and an 
acceptance of violence in daily life (Messner and Rosen-
feld 2007; Anderson 1999). Anderson (1999), in particular, 
believes that areas with high levels of crime, such as the 
illicit drug and property crimes that we identify as media-
tors, are characterized by a predominant belief that the use 
of violence, and even lethal violence, can be an acceptable 
response to personal affronts and an effective means of sur-
vival. If this is a commonly held belief surrounding prop-
erty crime and illicit drug markets in our sample areas, we 
may not expect that unbalanced pecuniary value commit-
ments would amplify the effect of property and drug crime 
levels on homicide rates. However, in nations other than 
the United States, criminal markets are not so uniformly 
violent and there may be more potential for unbalanced 
value commitments to condition the effects of property and 
drug crime rates on levels of homicide. Thus, we believe that 
applying this analytical model to social contexts outside of 
the United States would constitute an important advance-
ment of the anomie perspective.
In conclusion, our primary goal in this study has been to 
question the relevance of classic and contemporary ano-
mie theories for explaining variation in homicide rates, 
and hopefully to stimulate discussion of the ways in which 
anomie perspectives may be expanded to explicitly incor-
porate levels of lethal violence in their scope. While our 
findings do not invalidate prior research that assumes only 
a direct effect of anomic conditions on homicide rates, they 
do suggest that the processes through which an unbalanced 
pecuniary value system influences levels of lethal violence 
are complex and require additional attention. Though 
further research is necessary to draw firm conclusions 
about these causal pathways both within and outside of the 
United States, we believe our findings present an important 
step in explicating the links between anomic social condi-
tions and homicide.
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Appendix: Description of selected variables included in the analysis of anomie and homicide
Variable Variable definition
Social structural position
Limited job opportunities Ratio of total persons aged 16 and older who are employed or seeking employment to number of jobs available.
Low educational and economic attainment
Six item standardized scale that combines the percentage aged 16-19 who are not high school graduates or currently in school, the percen-
tage of persons aged 25 and older who did not finish high school, the percentage of persons in the civilian labor force who are unemployed, 
the percentage in the labor force employed in non-management and non-professional jobs, the percentage of families with incomes below  
the poverty line, and the mean self-reported social class standing of community residents (4=lower class . . . 1=upper class).
Educational and income inequality Two item standardized scale that combines the Gini index of family income inequality and the Gini index of educational inequality.
Strength of non-economic social institutions
Educational
Pupils per teacher Pupils per teacher for schools in sample areas.
% of government spending devoted to education Percentage of government spending devoted to education.
Political
Voter participation
Two item standardized scale combining the percentage aged 18 and older registered to vote and the percentage of registered voters who 
voted in the Presidential election.
Welfare Aassistance
Two item standardized scale combining the percentage of poor families receiving welfare and the average monthly welfare payment per  
poor person, adjusted for local cost of living.
Familial
Time with family Three item standardized scale combining the percentage who socialized several times a month with siblings, parents, and other relatives.
Commitment to marriage
Two item standardized scale combining the percentage of respondents currently married and the percentage indicating support for laws  
making it more difficult to divorce.
Religious
Civically engaged church adherence rate The number of persons per 100,000 who adhere to civically engaged church denominations.
Community
Social capital
Four item standardized scale combining the percentage who say that most people can be trusted, the percentage who say that  most people 
try to be fair, the percentage who say that most people try to be helpful, and the per capita  number of groups and associations to which 
respondents belong.
Control variables
Daily television viewing Mean number of hours residents spent watching television in a typical day.
Population structure Two item standardized scale combining logged population size and logged population density.
Resource deprivation
Two item standardized scale combining the percentage of residents who are poor, the percentage of families with children headed  by a 
female, the percentage of residents who are black, and median family income.
Age structure Percentage age 16 to 34.
Police strength Police officers per 100,000 residents.
Region Dummy variable indicating community location in a Southern state (0=non-south; 1=south)
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